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Casenote

Reasonable Restrictions on the Franchise:
Georgia's Voter Identification Act of 2006

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v. Perdue,' the Georgia Supreme
Court declared constitutional the Voter Identification Act of 2006 (2006
Act),' insofar as it required registered Georgia voters to present valid
photo identification at the polls when voting in person in any Georgia
election.' The 2006 Act was the most recent amendment in a series of
iterations of section 21-2-417 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.)-the provision of the Georgia code imposing certain polling
requirements for in-person voting.5 Each version of the law has
generated much controversy as to polling and voting requirements in
Georgia, and the law has been challenged in both federal and state court
for perceived violations of both the United States and Georgia constitu-

1. 288 Ga. 720, 707 S.E.2d 67 (2011).
2. Ga. H.R. Bill 432, Reg. Sess., 2006 Ga. Laws 3 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of O.C.G.A. tits. 21 & 40).
3. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 729, 707 S.E.2d at 75.
4. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417 (2008).
5. Id.
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tions." In Perdue, however, the Georgia Supreme Court, in a 6-1
opinion, declared the law constitutional under the Georgia Constitution,
holding that the state had an important regulatory interest in preventing fraud at the polls, and the reasonable, non-discriminatory regulations passed constitutional muster.7 Interestingly, the court ruled in
favor of the state despite a lack of an actual showing of fraud in support
of the photo ID law.'
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This lawsuit represented the second state court constitutional
challenge to the 2006 Act,9 following a complex string of federal and
state court challenges to the photo ID law.'o In Democratic Party of
Georgia, Inc. v. Perdue," the Democratic Party of Georgia filed a
declaratory action against Georgia election officials, challenging the
constitutionality of the 2006 Act and seeking permanent injunctive relief
against enforcement of the law.'2 Following the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the election officials, the Democratic
Party appealed the ruling to the Georgia Supreme Court, alleging a
violation of the Georgia Constitution in the form of an undue burden on
Georgia voters' fundamental right to vote."
In a 6-1 opinion, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the
trial court and found in favor of the Georgia election officials charged
with administering the 2006 Act. 4 Writing for the majority, Justice
Thompson held that prevention of fraud by impersonation was a
legitimate state interest justifying a reasonable restriction on the
5
franchise, finding in favor of the Georgia election officials.

6. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 720-22, 707 S.E.2d at 69-70.
7. Id. at 728-30, 707 S.E.2d at 74-75.
8. See id. at 729-30, 707 S.E.2d at 75.
9. Ga. H.R. Bill 432, Reg. Sess., 2006 Ga. Laws 3 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of O.C.G.A. tits. 21 & 40).
10. See generally Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Common Cause/Ga.III), 504 F. Supp.
2d 1333, 1337-42 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
11. 288 Ga. 720, 707 S.E.2d 67 (2011).
12. Id. at 720, 707 S.E.2d at 69.
13. Id. The Supreme Court of Georgia may exercise direct appellate review over equity
cases such as those seeking injunctive relief against the state. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6,
para. 3.
14. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 730, 707 S.E.2d at 75.
15. Id.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

At the turn of the twenty-first century, a troubling tone was set for the
conduct of elections in the United States with the now infamous 2000
presidential election between then Texas Governor George W Bush and
Vice President Al Gore. Controversies surrounding that election
-especially the conduct of Florida election officials with respect to
"butterfly" ballots and inaccuracies in vote-counting-gave rise to harsh
criticism for both the legal treatment of the outcome of that election and
the way in which the voting process itself had been conducted.16
It is likely that episodes similar to the 2000 presidential election
precipitated the recent phenomena in stringent state regulation of
elections, such as required presentation of valid photo identification at
polling precincts." Georgia is not unique in its passage of the Voter ID
Act of 2006;'8 this state joins a host of others that have enacted similar
photo ID laws with varying degrees of stringency." The following
analysis provides a general overview of the federal courts' treatment of
state voting regulations and the scrutiny applied to such laws, providing
the background to the state constitutional challenge in DemocraticParty
of Georgia v. Perdue.20
A.

Federal Court D-eatment of State Voting Regulations
Article I of the United States Constitution allocates the power to
facilitate the time, manner, and place of both federal and state elections
to state legislatures.2' The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Elections Clause provides broad power for the state
facilitation of elections so long as that power does not infringe upon
other constitutional provisions, particularly those pertaining to
individual voting rights.22 That broad power under the Elections
Clause includes state laws controlling the "registration, supervision of

16. See generally Jonathan K. Van Patten, Making Sense of Bush v. Gore, 47 S.D. L.
REV. 32 (2002) (discussing the Florida recount controversy, the Supreme Court's
intervention, and its aftermath and implications).
17. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting
Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689,689-90 (2006) (discussing the social response to the election
and the legal reaction in the form of voting regulation).
18. Ga. H.R. Bill 432, Reg. Sess., 2006 Ga. Laws 3 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of O.C.G.A. tits. 21 & 40).
19. See WENDY R. WEISER & LAWRENCE NORDEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, VOTING
LAw CHANGES IN 2012 4-5 (2012).
20. 288 Ga. 720, 707 S.E.2d 67 (2011).

21. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 4.
22. See Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523-24 (2001).
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voting, protection of voters, [and] prevention of fraud and corrupt
practices."2 3 The genesis of state photo ID laws-requiring a showing of
one or more forms of government-issued photo ID-is found in this broad
interpretation of the Elections Clause.
Two cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, articulated by Judge Posner, help to provide an overview of the
federal courts' treatment of such state voting regulations, in particular
the recent trend in state photo ID laws. In Griffin v. Roupas," Judge
Posner wrote that the Elections Clause, without infringing upon other
constitutional provisions, permits states to draft "extensive restrictions
on voting," which, by necessity, will affect the ability of some minority
groups to cast a ballot.' The crucial issue in cases challenging state
voting restrictions, though, is not the extent to which such groups are
disenfranchised but, rather, whether the "resulting exclusion[s] are
reasonable given the interest the restriction serves. 26 In Griffin, a
group representing working mothers challenged an Illinois law providing
narrow qualifications for absentee voting because the law did not include
a qualification for general hardship, which, they argued, should be
guaranteed to them under the United States Constitution.27 Recognizing that striking the balance between preventing voter fraud and
enabling voters to cast their ballots is a state legislative function, Judge
Posner wrote that the Illinois absentee provisions were not so facially
egregious and inimical to due process or equal protection as to warrant
judicial interference.2 8
Another Seventh Circuit case, Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board," dealt with a constitutional challenge to Indiana's photo ID law
requiring presentation of valid government photo ID when voting in
person in any Indiana election.'o Affirming the Seventh Circuit, the

23. See id. (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932)).
24. 385 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 923 (2005).
25. Id. at 1130.
26. Id. (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438-42 (1992)).
27. Id. at 1129.
28. See id. at 1132 (noting that "unavoidable inequalities in treatment, even if intended
in the sense of being known to follow ineluctably from a deliberate policy, do not violate
equal protection").
29. 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007).
30. Id. at 950; IND. CODE § 3-10-1-7.2 (Supp. 2008). In Crawford, the Seventh Circuit
refused to apply strict scrutiny-requiring a narrowly tailored law advancing a compelling
state interest-to Indiana's law, noting that the Supreme Court rejected that level of
scrutiny in an earlier case because it would impermissibly bind the states' broad Elections
Clause authority. 472 F.3d at 952 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,433-34 (1992)).
The court upheld Indiana's law on the grounds that the state advanced a reasonable
interest in preventing voter fraud against the slight burden on Indiana voters. Id. at 952-
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United States Supreme Court held that preventing voter fraud is a
"valid neutral justificationl" sufficiently supporting the Indiana voting
law.31 Interestingly, the Supreme Court acknowledged in Crawford
that there was no evidence or any cases of actual fraud by impersonation
ever occurring in the state of Indiana." Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court rejected the appellant's argument that criminal laws against voter
fraud provided adequate protection, making Indiana's law unnecessary." The Court held further that even though no actual examples of
fraud by impersonation could be shown in Indiana, the fact that such
fraud occurs more generally in other American elections gave that
justification legitimacy.' Avoiding the political question of whether the
Indiana law was good policy, the Court stated that "[w]hile the most
effective method of preventing election fraud may well be debatable, the
propriety of doing so is perfectly clear.""
The Seventh Circuit, in both Griffin and Crawford, relied on a
balancing test reinforced in an earlier Supreme Court case addressing
In Burdick v. Takushi,3' the Supreme Court
state voting laws.
refused to apply a strict level of scrutiny where the state election law
imposed only a minimal burden on voters, holding that general, nondiscriminatory regulations pursuant to the state's Elections Clause
powers will generally justify that minimal burden." Applying that
standard to the facts of Burdick, the Court held that a Hawaii law
prohibiting write-in voting was a reasonable voting administration law
that imposed only a minimal burden on some Hawaiian voters." The
Court noted that "any burden on the right to vote for the candidate of
one's choice will be light and normally will be counterbalanced by the
very state interests supporting the ballot access scheme."40

53. Judge Posner wrote that "[tlo deem ordinary and widespread burdens like these severe
would subject virtually every electoral regulation to strict scrutiny, hamper the ability of
States to run efficient and equitable elections, and compel federal courts to rewrite state
electoral codes." Id. at 954 (quoting Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 593 (2005)).
31. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008).
32. Id. at 194. The same recognition was made by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. See Crawford, 472 F.3d at 953.
33. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 194-96.
34. Id. at 195-96.
35. Id. at 196.
36. Griffin, 385 F.3d at 1130 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438-42 (1992));
Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992)).
37. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
38. Id. at 434 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-89 (1983)).
39. Id. at 441-42.
40. Id. at 441. The Court in Burdick was expanding on a more general articulation of
the balancing test for state election laws found in Anderson v. Celebrezze. See 460 U.S.
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The federal courts' treatment of state voting regulation, then, is based
on the balance between the state's asserted justification and the degree
to which it burdens the franchise." The analysis will hinge on the
severity of the burden, and only severe burdens on the franchise will be
subject to strict scrutiny."' But where the court finds that the burden
is minimal, reasonable and non-discriminatory restrictions will justify
the burden on the franchise consistent with the fundamental right to
vote under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.43

B. Georgia'sVoter IdentificationLaw of 1997
In 1997, the Georgia General Assembly amended Title 21 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), 44 controlling elections
conducted in the state of Georgia, and added provisions requiring the
presentation of certain forms of government-issued identification by an
elector upon registration or voting.45 According to those provisions,
each elector was required to "present proper identification to a poll
worker at or prior to completion of a voter's certificate at any polling

780, 788 (1983). In Anderson, an Ohio statute requiring registration of independent
presidential candidates in March of an election year was challenged by an independent
candidate who was denied a nomination on the ballot by the Ohio Secretary of State
because he filed in April, one month past the deadline. Id. at 782. The candidate
challenged the statute on Equal Protection grounds, arguing that there was no legitimate
interest advanced by the state in requiring independent candidates to register seven
months before the election. Id. at 783. The Supreme Court agreed, declaring the law
unconstitutional on the grounds that the state's justification-protecting political
stability-did not justify the burden on independent candidates and voters. Id. at 805-06.
This outcome was consistent with the Court's proclamation that "the state's important
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions," Id. at 788 (footnote omitted). However, "[ilf the State has open to it a less
drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose a legislative scheme
that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal liberties." Id. at 806 (quoting
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973)). The Court did resolve further, however, that
challenges to specific provisions of a State's election laws therefore cannot be
resolved by any "litmus-paper test" that will separate valid from invalid
restrictions ....
[Tihe Court must not only determine the legitimacy and
strength of each [state] interest]; it also must consider the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights.
Id. at 789.
41. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-89).
42. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
43. Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788); see also U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44. O.C.G.A. tit. 21 (2008 & Supp. 2011).
45. Ga. S. Bill 273, Reg. Sess., 1997 Ga. Laws 662 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of O.C.G.A. tit. 21).
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place.' The newly-added § 21-2-417 then listed fourteen categories of
identification that would be accepted under this requirement, including
a Georgia driver's license, government employee identification card,
passport, a student identification card from a school located in Georgia,
This section provided
and even a valid hunting or fishing license.
further that, if the elector was unable to provide one of the allowed
forms of identification, they would be able to vote after swearing under
oath and threat of a punishable felony as to their identity, which
required no further affiance or confirmation following the ballotcasting.48 This law was considered a drastic change in the conduct of
Georgia elections,49 but was not challenged in state or federal court on
constitutional grounds.
C. The Amended Voter Identification Law of 2005
In 2005, the General Assembly amended the voter ID law, providing
a more restrictive list of approved forms of identification and introducing
the new caveat that if a Georgia voter voting in person lacked acceptable
identification and had to cast a provisional ballot by signing an affidavit
as to their identity, they would have to verify their identity within a
certain amount of time at the county registrar's office with a state-issued
ID.O The new list of approved identification was limited to a Georgia
driver's license, government employee identification card, passport,
military ID, or tribal identification card." If a voter casting a provisional ballot did not have one of these acceptable forms of ID to confirm
their identity at the county registrar's office, then they could obtain a
52
special, provisional ID at the Department of Driver Services (DDS).

46. Ga. S. Bill 273, § 3, 1997 Ga. Laws at 664 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417 (Supp.
1998) (current version at O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-417 to -417.1 (2008))).
47. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417(aXl)-(14) (current version at O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-417 to -417.1
(2008)).
48. Id. § 21-2-417 (b) (Supp. 1998) (current version at O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-417 to -417.1
(2008)).
49. See Peter Mantius, Coming in '98: With ID, One Vote, ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 1,
1997, at B (writing that the new voter identification law was a "sweeping [change] in
Georgia voting law,"having been approved by the United States Department of Justice and
quoting then Secretary of State Lewis Massey: "I believe we have moved Georgia into the
forefront of ballot security"; also noting that a similar law was passed in 1994 but never
approved by the Justice Department); see also Stacy Shelton, State Beats Sugar Hill to
Punch on Voter ID Law, ATLANTA J. CONST., Apr. 16, 1997, at J (quoting state representative Vance Smith, Jr. and writing that "the purpose was to 'hold down on voter fraud'").
50. Ga. H.R. Bill 244, § 59, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 253, 295 (codified at O.C.GA.
§ 21-2-417 (Supp. 2005) (repealed 2006)).
51. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417(aXl)-(6) (Supp. 2005) (repealed 2006).
52. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417(b) (Supp. 2005) (repealed 2006).
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The new law provided specifically that if a voter wished to obtain a card,
they would not be charged for one so long as they swore under oath at
the DDS that they were either indigent or needed the card to cast a vote
and could not afford the required fee normally charged for such cards."
In September of 2005, the first legal challenge to Georgia's photo ID
law was brought in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia." After conducting an injunction hearing, the
district court in Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Common Cause/Ga.
I)P preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of the 2005 amendments to
the photo ID law pending ultimate adjudication of the plaintiffs' claims
before the court.56 Although the district court was precluded from
addressing the plaintiffs' claims under the Georgia Constitution by the
Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution," the court did find that
the plaintiffs' federal constitutional challenge was likely meritorious
because the photo ID requirement inadvertently constituted a poll tax
in violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
and the burden on Georgia voters was impermissible in light of the
state's purported justification."

53. Ga. H.R. Bill 244, § 66, 2005 Ga. Laws at 301 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.

§ 40-5-103(d) (Supp. 2005) (repealed 2006)).
54. See Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Common Cause/Ga. 1), 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326
(N.D. Ga. 2005). The suit was brought by a non-partisan citizen lobby group devoted to
ethics in government and preservation of the franchise on behalf of other groups in
opposition to the photo ID law and Georgia voters against Georgia election officials
responsible for enforcing the law. Id. at 1329-1331. The plaintiffs asserted numerous
claims against the law: the photo ID requirement violated the Georgia constitution, the law
constituted a poll tax in violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and the Equal
Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution, the law unduly burdened the fundamental right
to vote, and that it violated both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. Id. at 1354. Based on these claims, the plaintiffs sought to have the photo ID
law preliminarily enjoined in anticipation of the impending off-year election in November.
Id. at 1354-55.
55. 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
56. Id. at 1377-78. The district court based this finding upon the plaintiffs' satisfaction
of the four elements necessary for a preliminary injunction: the plaintiffs had a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits, they would suffer irreparable harm if the law were not
enjoined, the potential harm to the plaintiffs outweighed the potential harm to the
defendants, and the injunction would serve the public interest. Id. at 1376.
57. Id. at 1356-60 (quoting DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Schrenko, 109 F.3d 680, 687
(11th Cir. 1997)) ("In short, the Eleventh Amendment constitutes an 'absolute bar' to a
state's being sued by its own citizens, among others.").
58. Id. at 1376. The court also held that the plaintiffs produced insufficient evidence
to support their claims under the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act. Id. at 1372,
1375.
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The court reached its poll tax conclusion based on the fact that
Georgia voters had to pay a fee to obtain a card that satisfied the 2005
Importantly, the court
amended list of acceptable identification."
recognized that the photo ID law provided exceptions for indigent voters
and those who otherwise could not afford the card fee; notwithstanding
those exceptions, the court held "the fact that some individuals avoid
paying the cost for the Photo ID card does not mean that the Photo ID
card is not a poll tax."60 Furthermore, applying the Burdick standard
controlling state regulation of voting, the court held that the asserted
state interest of preventing voter fraud did not justify the burden on
Georgia voters' fundamental right to vote due to the fees collected on
issuing photo ID cards.e" The court held that the law was not narrowly
tailored to achieve the state's interest of preventing voter fraud, and,
coupled with the impermissible burden on the fundamental right to vote,
was likely to fail under the Burdick or strict scrutiny standard.62
Therefore, holding that the plaintiffs would likely succeed on their
claims that the law unduly burdened the fundamental right to vote and
constituted a poll tax, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction on October 18, 2005.63
The Amended Voter Identification Law of 2006
Almost immediately following the injunction of the 2005 amendments
to the photo ID law by the district court in Common Cause/Ga.I, the
Georgia General Assembly amended the photo ID law yet again in early
2006.6
Two important changes were made to the law, prompted
specifically by the defects noted by the district court in Common
Cause / Ga. 1: (1) to the list of acceptable photo ID was added the new
"Georgia voter identification card," and (2) a new code section was

D.

59. Id. at 1369-70.
60. Id. at 1370.
61. Id. at 1366. Importantly, the district court addressed the likelihood of success of
the plaintiffs' Equal Protection claims under both the Burdick standard and a strict
scrutiny analysis, finding that under either standard-depending on how burdensome a
court may find the photo ID law-that the plaintiffs had a likelihood of success on the
merits because of the fee imposition. See id. at 1361-66; see also Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
62. Common Cause/Ga. 1, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1366 (noting Secretary of State Cathy
Cox's testimony that, in her eight years in office, she received not a single complaint of
voter fraud or impersonation, reinforcing the court's conclusion that the purported state
justification for the law failed the Burdick standard).
63. Id. at 1376-78.
64. Ga. H.R. Bill 432, 2006 Ga. Laws 3 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
O.C.G.A. tits. 21 & 40).
65. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417(aX2).
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added providing explicitly that such cards would be provided free of
charge to any Georgia voter, without exception.6 Although seemingly
small changes, these amendments proved significant and changed the
course of Georgia's voter identification law.
1. Impact on the Federal Challenge. On April 26, 2006, the
Common Cause/Ga. plaintiffs amended their federal complaint to
challenge the 2006 amendments upon substantially similar grounds as
the challenge to the 2005 amendments, which were preliminarily
enjoined in Common Cause/Ga. I.61 On July 5, 2006, the plaintiffs
filed another motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the
enforcement of the 2006 amendments on the grounds that the law
imposed an undue burden on Georgia voters' fundamental right to vote
under the Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution."
Although the district court ultimately granted an injunction against the
2006 Act, the court based that decision on very different grounds than
the injunction in Common Cause/Ga. I and specifically limited the
injunction to the July 18, 2006 primary elections and subsequent run-off
elections."
First, the district court enjoined enforcement of the 2006*Act in the
July 18, 2006 primary because it constituted an impermissible burden
on the right to vote under the Burdick standard."o Unlike the burden
imposed by the 2005 amendments, the court determined that the severe
burden imposed by the 2006 Act was not in its technical requirements
but, instead, was created by the lack of effort to educate Georgia voters
about the new requirements between the law's enactment and the July
The court held that a significant number of Georgia
18 primary.'
voters would be severely burdened by the law because the state would
be unable to adequately educate voters about the new requirements
before the primary, and many of those who may know about the new
requirements may still be unable to procure a free voter ID card before
the primary.72 As a result, many voters would be caught unaware and

66. Id. § 21-2-417.1(a).
67. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Common Cause /Ga. 1), 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1298,
1303 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Common Cause/Ga. I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
68. Common Cause/Ga.II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1299-1300.
69. Id. at 1360.
70. See id. at 1351-52.
71. Id. at 1351.
72. Id.
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discouraged from voting for want of knowledge about the new law,
thereby creating a severe burden."
Second, the district court rejected the plaintiffs' poll tax claim as to
the 2006 Act." Because the new law eliminated the requirement that
a voter would have to swear that they were either indigent or could not
afford the voter ID card in order to get one for free, the poll tax
effectively created by the 2005 amendments was eliminated." Moreover, the court rejected the plaintiffs' more creative argument that
travelling to the DDS to obtain a card was itself a poll tax." Absent
a showing that a Georgia voter would incur any sort of actual monetary
cost in obtaining a card, the court held that the poll tax claim was no
longer meritorious."
Thus, because of the severe burden resulting from the state's lack of
educational efforts regarding the 2006 Act and the likelihood that many
voters would be caught unaware in the July 18 primary, the district
court enjoined enforcement of the 2006 Act. 8
2. The First State Court Constitutional Challenge. The 2006
amendments also gave rise to the first constitutional challenge to the
photo ID law in state court. In Perdue v. Lake,7 a Georgia voter filed
a declaratory action to have the 2006 Act declared unconstitutional
under Article II, Section I, Parts II and III of the Georgia Constitution.80 Although the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and
declared the law unconstitutional pursuant to those constitutional
provisions, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the permanent injunction
entered by the trial court and remanded with instructions to dismiss on
the grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the constitu-

73. See id. It is important to note, however, that in finding the law constituted a
severe burden, the court only reached that conclusion because of the fast-approaching July
18 primary. Id. In fact, the court notes explicitly that the photo ID requirement was not
necessarily unconstitutional as to future elections; it was only overly burdensome as to the
July 18 primary because so many voters would be unaware of the new law. Id. at 1351-52.
74. Id. at 1354-55.
75. Id. at 1354.
76. Id. at 1354-55.
77. Id. at 1355.
78. Id. at 1360. In addition to finding that the poll tax claim against the 2006 Act
lacked any merit, the court also found that the plaintiffs' claims under the Civil Rights Act
and the Voting Rights Act were equally unmeritorious. Id at 1357-58.
79. 282 Ga. 348, 647 S.E.2d 6 (2007).
80. Id. at 348; GA. CONsT. art. II, § 1, para. 2-3 (providing that any resident Georgia
voter at least eighteen years old and not disenfranchised by any other part of Article II is
entitled to vote-exceptions including conviction of a "felony involving moral turpitude" and
any "person who has been judicially determined to be mentally incompetent").
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tionality of the 2006 Act.8' The court stated that the plaintiff lacked
standing because she fell within two excepted categories of voters not
required to present photo ID at the polls and, therefore, she had suffered
no injury sufficient to give her standing.8 2 The court did not address
the merits of the plaintiffs claim or determine whether the 2006 Act was
constitutional under the Georgia Constitution.'
3. The Adjudication of the Common Cause/Ga. Federal
Challenge. The decision in Lake was handed down by the Georgia
Supreme Court on June 11, 2007. On August 1, 2007, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia lifted a stay of
proceedings on the Common Cause/Ga. litigation-instituted in anticipation of the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in Lake-and set a
bench trial date to adjudicate the merits of the federal challenge.' The
only remaining claim asserted at trial by the Common Cause/Ga.
plaintiffs was that the 2006 Act unduly burdened Georgia voters'
fundamental right to vote under the Equal Protection clause of the U.S.
Constitution.'
Although the district court concluded that none of the plaintiffs
remaining in the Common Cause/Ga. litigation had standing to
challenge the 2006 Act, the court nonetheless addressed the plaintiffs'
claims and the constitutionality of the photo ID law." The district
court determined on the sole remaining claim-that the 2006 Act
burdened Georgia voters' fundamental right to vote protected by the
Equal Protection clause-that the burden demonstrated by the plaintiffs
was minimal and therefore the state's asserted interest of preventing
voter fraud, reasonable on its face, was sufficient to justify that
burden."
Under the Burdick standard, the court held that the
plaintiffs did not have a likely successful constitutional challenge to the
2006 Act.88

81. Lake, 282 Ga. at 350, 647 S.E.2d at 8.
82. Id. at 349-50, 647 S.E.2d at 7-8; see also id. at 348, 647 S.E.2d at 7 (noting that "the
only prerequisite to attacking the constitutionality of a statute is a showing that it is
hurtful to the attacker") (quoting Agan v. State, 272 Ga. 540, 542, 533 S.E.2d 60, 62
(2000)).
83. See id. at 349-50, 647 S.E.2d at 8.
84. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Common Cause/Ga.III), 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1341
(N.D. Ga. 2007). See generally id. at 1337-42 (outlining with a detailed timeline the
various stages of and challenges to Georgia's photo ID law leading up to this case).
85. Id. at 1342.
86. Id. at 1374.
87. Id. at 1382.
88. See id. at 1382-83.
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the order of
the district court dismissing the plaintiffs for lack of standing but
ultimately concluded that, on the merits of the claim, the district court
correctly concluded that the 2006 Act was constitutional and entered a
ruling in favor of the Georgia election officials." Adhering to the
Burdick standard, the court held that "[tihe insignificant burden
imposed by the Georgia statute is outweighed by the interests in
detecting and deterring voter fraud," and therefore the fraud justification
was sufficient to justify the burden on Georgia voters."o Certiorari was
unanimously denied by the United States Supreme Court.9 '
4. The Rise of the Present Action. Following the ultimate
adjudication of the Common Cause /Ga. litigation, a second constitutional challenge was filed in state court, giving rise to the present action.
On May 23, 2008, the Democratic Party of Georgia filed suit against
Georgia election officials, alleging that the 2006 Act was unconstitutional
because of the undue qualification and burden it placed on Georgia
voters.92
Having unsuccessfully secured injunctions against the
enforcement of the Act in both the July 2008 primary election and the
November 2008 general election, a trial was conducted on the merits of
the plaintiffs' claims." The trial court found that the 2006 Act neither
placed an undue qualification on Georgia voters nor imposed an undue
burden in violation of the Georgia Constitution's equal protection clause,
granting the Georgia election officials' motion for summary judgment.94
The Democratic Party of Georgia appealed to the Georgia Supreme
Court.
IV.

THE COURT'S RATIONALE

A.

The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority in Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v.
Perdue," Justice Thompson held for the Georgia election officials,
holding that the 2006 Act 96 was a reasonable restriction on the fran-

89. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups (Common Cause /Ga. IV), 554 F.3d 1340,1357 (2009).
90. Id. at 1354.
91. Id., cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2770 (2009).
92. Democratic Party of Ga., Inc. v. Perdue, 288 Ga. 720,723,707 S.E.2d 67,71(2011).
93. Id. at 723-24, 707 S.E.2d at 71.
94. Id. at 724, 707 S.E.2d at 71.
95. 288 Ga. 720, 707 S.E.2d 67 (2011).
96. Ga. H.R. Bill 432, Reg. Sess., 2006 Ga. Laws 3 (codified in scattered sections of
O.C.G.A. tits. 21 & 40).
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chise in advancing the legitimate state interest of preventing voter
fraud." In holding for the state, the court addressed the three
arguments advanced by the Democratic Party of Georgia." First, the
Democratic Party argued that the 2006 Act imposed an undue qualification or condition on the right to vote in violation of Article II of the
Georgia Constitution." Second, they argued that the Act creates an
independent ground on which voters may be disqualified in contravention of the constitution's express disqualification provisions.100 Lastly,
they argued that the Act imposed an undue burden on Georgia voters in
violation of the Georgia Constitution's equal protection clause.' 0
The Georgia Supreme Court rejected all of the Democratic Party's
arguments. 02 First, they held that although the Georgia Constitution
provides that Georgia residents at least eighteen years of age and not
otherwise disqualified under other constitutional provisions shall have
the unhindered right to vote, the same provision also provides that the
Georgia General Assembly has the power to administer reasonable
regulations to determine voter eligibility.'0 o The court held that so
long as such restrictions are not so burdensome as to effectively deny the
right to vote, they are within the power afforded the General Assembly
Moreover, the court held that the Act also
under the constitution.'
does not impose an undue qualification, as the law does not deprive
anyone the right to vote but instead merely provides for a procedural
requirement that can be satisfied by any Georgia voter who obtains a
free voter ID card.'s Lastly, as to the Democratic Party's first two
arguments, the court held that the Act does not create an independent
ground for disqualification aside from those articulated in Article II of
the Georgia Constitution because the requirements of the Act were
merely procedures for identity validation, not voter disenfranchisement. 06
Addressing the Democratic Party's final equal protection argument,
the court held that the minimal burden imposed on Georgia voters was

97. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 730, 707 S.E.2d at 75.
98. Id. at 724, 727-28, 707 S.E.2d at 71, 73-74.
99. Id. at 724, 707 S.E.2d at 71; see also GA. CONST. art. II, § 1, para. 2.
100. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 727, 707 S.E.2d at 74; see also GA. CONST. art. II, § 1, para. 3.
101. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 727, 707 S.E.2d at 74; see also GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 2.
102. See Perdue, 288 Ga. at 730, 707 S.E.2d at 75.
103. Id. at 725, 707 S.E.2d at 72; GA. CONST. art. II, § 1, para. 2 ("The General
Assembly shall provide by law for the registration of electors.").
104. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 725,707 S.E.2d at 72 (quoting Franklin v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779,
790, 55 S.E.2d 221, 229 (1949)).
105. Id. at 726-27, 707 S.E.2d at 72-73.
106. Id. at 727, 707 S.E.2d at 74; see also GA. CONST. art. II, § 1, para. 3.
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reasonable and justified by the state's goal of fraud prevention."'o
Holding that Georgia's equal protection clause mirrors the protections
of the United States Constitution's Equal Protection Clause... as to the
fundamental right to vote, the court applied the standards articulated
in Anderson v. Celebrezzexos and Burdick v. Takushi.xx Under the
Burdick standard, the 2006 Act's legitimate purpose of preventing voter
fraud justified the minimal burden imposed on Georgia voters and was
As a result, the court concluded, "[as] did
thus constitutional."'
that considered this issue, we find the photo
court
virtually every other
in the 2006 Act to be a minimal,
implemented
ID requirement as
which is warranted by the
restriction
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory
important regulatory interests of preventing voter fraud."'
B.

The Lone Dissent
Justice Benham offered the only dissent in this case."' Framing his
argument in the context of fringe groups of Georgia voters most
impacted by regulations such as the 2006 Act, Justice Benham wrote
that in the absence of an actual showing of fraud being prevented by the
2006 Act's regulations, the actual effect was not legitimate but was
instead an effective disenfranchisement of "the poor, infirm, and
elderly.""14 He explained that although the Georgia Assembly has
wide latitude in determining voter qualification by law, such requirements should not be permitted where they are so burdensome on some
groups of voters as to effectively deny them the right to vote. 1 5
Justice Benham suggested that while photo ID requirements may not be
very burdensome for many Georgia voters, that burden is amplified for
the poor, elderly, and infirm with limited access to transportation,
education about such voting laws, or the means to pay for collateral
"Such inconvenient and
expenses to obtain such identification.'
difficult impediments," he wrote, "to exercising the franchise are in
express contradiction of [the Georgia Constitution].""'

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Perdue, 288 Ga. at 730, 707 S.E.2d at 75.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
Perdue, 288 Ga. at 729, 707 S.E.2d at 74-75.
Id. at 730, 707 S.E.2d at 75.
Id. at 730-34, 707 S.E.2d at 76-78 (Benham, J., dissenting).
Id. at 731, 707 S.E.2d at 76.
Id. at 732, 707 S.E.2d at 77.
Id. at 733, 707 S.E.2d at 77-78.
Id. (citing Franklin, 205 Ga. 779, 55 S.E.2d 221).
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IMPLICATIONS

Applying the balancing test of Anderson v. Celebrezze,"1 the court

held in Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v. Perdue"e that preventing
voter fraud was an adequate justification for a state voting law requiring
presentation of photo ID at the polls.120 Because the burden on voters
was minimal in the opinion of the court-as there are adequate voting
alternatives available and the process to obtain a voter ID is easy-the
court did not apply the more stringent standard requiring that a severe
burden on voters must be justified by a narrowly-drawn and compelling
state interest.121 Seemingly, then, the court has established a low bar
for state justification of voting laws under the Anderson test where the
burden on voters is minimal because, as the Democratic Party of Georgia
offered to the court, there was virtually no showing of an actual issue of
fraud in Georgia elections before the court.122
In its brief before the court, the Democratic Party offered support for
the argument that in-person voter fraud is not a pressing problem in
Georgia elections."ss It noted that the Georgia Secretary of State
recognized-in response to the 2006 Act' 24-that in the nine years she
was in office, there was not a single case of fraudulent misrepresentation
at the polls resulting from impersonation.125 Moreover, the Secretary
of State also observed that while there were no cases of voter impersonation, her office regularly dealt with fraud by absentee ballot.126
Resting on the Secretary of State's assertions, the Democratic Party
argued that while there was no true underlying fraud being prevented,
there was a real impact felt by certain blocks of voters, particularly
among poor communities and the African-American community where
the impact is "most acutely felt." 27 In dissent, Judge Benham arrived
at the same conclusion, stating that "the 'free' voter identification card
... is an unnecessary construct making the ability to vote more

118. 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
119. 288 Ga. 720, 707 S.E.2d 67 (2011).
120. Id. at 729-30, 707 S.E.2d at 74-75.
121. Id. (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
122. Brief of Appellant, Perdue, 288 Ga. 720, 707 S.E.2d 67 (No. S10A1517), 2010 WL
3252954, at *3-4 (arguing that the fraud justification is facile at best and based largely on
bare assumption that fraud is a pressing problem in Georgia elections).
123. See id. at *4.
124. Ga. H.R. Bill 432, Reg. Sess., 2006 Ga. Laws 3 (codified in scattered sections of
O.C.G.A. tits. 21 & 40).
125. Brief of Appellant, supra note 122.
126. Id.
127. Id. at *7-10.
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burdensome for persons who are poor, infirm, or elderly."" Nonetheless, the Georgia Supreme Court arrived at the conclusion in Perdue that
the fraud prevention justification was adequate support for the 2006 Act,
despite no actual showing of fraud by impersonation in Georgia
elections." The court even makes mention of Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board,o noting that the Supreme Court upheld
Indiana's photo ID law under the same standard (and further that the
dissent in Crawford cites to Georgia's photo ID law as a point of
comparison for Indiana's law, noting that Georgia's is less restrictive).'' Notwithstanding the absence of a showing of actual fraud, the
court accepted the fraud prevention justification in this case despite the
underlying indirect effects that the Democratic Party contended the law
will have on the poor and certain minority groups.'a Therefore, this
case seems to imply that where there is a minimal effect on the majority
of Georgia voters, a reasonable justification from the state will suffice
despite no actual showing of evidentiary support for that justification
and despite the indirect effects that law may have on certain minority
groups of Georgia voters. However, as the court pointed out in this case,
the appellants offered only the testimony of a single, elderly Georgia
voter who was unable to cast a vote in person on election day due to her
not having a valid photo ID."
Had the appellants made a more
impactful showing, for example where large numbers of minority Georgia
voters had been disenfranchised, then perhaps the court would have
been more persuaded by their argument.
What, then, is the real importance of this case where there is no
measurable, acute fraud being prevented and where the appellant's
showing of voter disenfranchisement is also lacking? The answer likely
does not lie with the evidentiary support, but instead it lies with the
true subject of the case itself: the franchise. Drawing on the tone of
Justice Benham's dissent,'M this case does not hold importance
because of the minimal effect the photo ID law may have on certain

128. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 733, 707 S.E.2d at 77 (Benham, J., dissenting).
129. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 730, 707 S.E.2d at 75 (majority opinion); see also Michael
Cooper, New State Rules Raising Hurdles at Voting Booth, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 2, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/03/us/new-state-laws-are-limiting-access-for-vot
ers.html?_r=1 (discussing Georgia's voter ID law in the grander scheme of other state voter
ID laws cropping up around the country as well as the Brennan Center's report).
130. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
131. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 730, 770 S.E.2d at 75; Crawford, 553 U.S. at 240 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
132. See Perdue, 288 Ga. at 730-33, 770 S.E.2d at 76-78 (Benham, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 729, 707 S.E.2d at 75 (majority opinion).
134. See id. at 730-34, 707 S.E.2d at 76-78 (Benham, J., dissenting).
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groups of voters, but instead it is a conversation worth having because
of the very institution it purportedly affects. Therefore, while the effect
of the photo ID law on the franchise may be minimal, this case offers a
reminder of the careful scrutiny that such laws should be subject to, as
they tend to affect the most important democratic institution in our
society: "the right to be among one's fellow citizens at the polling
precinct and to openly exercise his or her right to participate in a
democracy.""'
JOSEPH M. COLWELL

135. Id. at 733, 707 S.E.2d at 78.

